

NEW PUBLICATIONS.

SOCIETY FOR THE SOUTH; OR, THE FAILURE OF
FREE SOCIETY. By GEORGE FITZGUGH. Pp. 310, 12mo.
Richmond, Va. 1852.

There is one fact in the intellectual history of the United States worthy of more notice than has yet been bestowed upon it—a fact which cannot be without decisive weight in the ultimate settlement of many great pending questions. However our slave-holding brethren may have dominated politically over the North in every thing else speculative or practical, in religion, literature, science, arts, and industry, they have always been our very humble pupils and imitators, always certain, however reluctant, to follow us at last—though often so far behind as well as true, just as we are beginning to lay them aside as erroneous, or at least as insufficient.

The Anti-Slavery agitation has produced an effect at the North upon philosophical speculation far more decisive than upon politics. The inquiries which it has set on foot as to the true basis, the extent and the limitations of authority have interfered to a very serious extent with old established opinions in morals and theology, and have led to many new and to some rather startling suggestions. Discussions as to the theory of society have been very active among us for quite a number of years. The South too, it would seem, is at length beginning to feel the magnetic influence of these discussions, disturbing the torpid stagnation of even plaster brains, and beginning to breed therein some very curious maggots. The work named at the head of this article is a pretty fair specimen of the sort of creature produced by a current of Anti-Slavery galvanism brought to operate for a sufficient length of time upon the hermetically sealed head of a Virginia slaveholder. Mr. Crose's famous experiment so much insisted upon in the *Vestiges of Creation*, produced, we believe, only a new species—if it was a new species—of the old and well-known genus bed-bug. The product obtained on the present occasion may prove perhaps about equally dignified in the scale of intellectual creation and equally useful. Yet, as in Mr. Crose's case, the phenomenon is well entitled to the most serious consideration. In Mr. Crose's case the great thing was to give origin to animal life, no matter of how humble a character, by chemical means. In the case of the slaveholders, the great thing is to get them to think at all. Give us no matter how humble and disgusting an insect to begin with, produced by merely chemical action, and there are hopes of producing in time no less an animal than man himself. And that productive activity of Southern intellect which began with such productions as Mr. Fitzgugh's *Society* may yet end in giving birth to some philosophic speculation honorable to its author and edifying to the world at large.

The feeble and tottering steps of the child beginning to learn to walk must be duly encouraged and admired, though in these first efforts it runs the risk of breaking its own head, and so far as its feebleness enables it, of breaking other things too. Yet beginning with these staggering and abortive attempts at locomotion, though it never may accomplish the object of its infant ambition by actually jumping over the moon, it may yet presently acquire the useful and indeed necessary accomplishments of being able to stand, to walk, and to turn. So, it is really delightful to find our Southern brethren are beginning to perceive that for human locomotion in its full sense, the use of the understanding is necessary as well as that of the legs, and we cordially welcome the first faint public indication of a concatenation of ideas to be found in Mr. Fitzgugh's book as an earnest of better things to come.

Inconsistency, self contradiction, failure to perceive the bearing of two or more propositions on each other, is a chief characteristic of all infant attempts at speculation—and this is strikingly evinced in the case of Mr. Fitzgugh. Thus he claims for himself the honor of having been the first to write the *Justification and Philosophy of Slavery*; "he puts forward the collection of rambling newspaper articles which make up his book, as a philosophical treatise, and the doctrines which he advocates as a discovery of novel scientific principles, while at the very same time he scouts all philosophy and holds up philosophers as a set of ridiculous visionaries." "There is not," says Mr. Fitzgugh, "a true moral philosophy"—and he uses the word moral in opposition to physical—"and from the nature of things there never can be" (p. 11). "Philosophers are the most abstracted, secluded and least observant of men. Their premises are always false, because they see few facts, and hence their conclusions must be false." And without doubt this description applies perfectly well to Mr. Fitzgugh, and the school of philosophical defenders of Slavery of which he claims to be the founder, based as it is in basing preposterous conclusions upon imaginary premises.

Nevertheless it must be confessed that in the preposition from which Fitzgugh sets out, and which gives birth to his book there is a certain just logical perception of consequences. The persevering bombardment kept up by the Abolitionists for the last twenty years upon the position of the slaveholders is beginning to tell. Mr. Fitzgugh, and many others with him, has been brought to perceive and to feel that this old slaveholding position is no longer tenable. To admit, as the fashion used to be, that Slavery is an evil, an economical, political, and even a moral evil, and at the same time to insist upon holding, trading, propagating and selling slaves, and opposing all schemes whatever of emancipation, is a logical absurdity. The perception of this absurdity the Abolitionists, by dint of persevering iteration, have at length beat into the heads of the more intelligent of the slaveholders, and of Mr. Fitzgugh among the number: and it is an attempt to find a new position upon which to retreat out of reach of this uncomfortable abolition cannonade that has given birth to his book, or rather to the fragmentary essays of which it is made up.

The fresh ground taken up or proposed to be taken up by Mr. Fitzgugh is this: Slavery is not an evil; on the contrary it is both a necessity and a blessing to those who are held as slaves. And this doctrine he undertakes to establish in no less than four ways: first, by Scripture; next, theoretically from the nature of man; thirdly, from the confessions and admissions of the professed

social reformers of Europe and America; and fourthly, from the experience of the South. Having been fairly routed out of their old equivocal, not to say hypocritical position of confessing Slavery to be an evil, weeping over it and then going on to perpetrate and extend it, nothing now remains for the slaveholders except either to turn their attention to some speedy and effectual means of getting rid of an admitted evil, or else to maintain with Mr. Fitzgugh that Slavery is not an evil. This is the alternative to which the pro-slavery party is now reduced; and as Providence often works by very mysterious means, employing the most unexpected and, humbly speaking, the most unlikely agents to accomplish its purposes, perhaps this very Mr. Fitzgugh, this Justifier and Philosopher of Slavery, as he dubs himself, is one of the instruments which a wise Providence intends to employ for bringing up the South to the sticking point of emancipation. Praise may be perfected and wisdom educated not merely out of the mouths of babes and sucklings, but also out of those of grown-up ninnies. The precedent of Balaam's ass is highly encouraging.

There is a method of demonstration much in use with geometers called the *reductio ad absurdum*. It consists in assuming a proposition to be true and then proceeding to reason upon it and to draw conclusions from it, and so demonstrating its falseness by showing the absurd consequences to which it leads. This method is also very applicable to moral, political and economical questions, in which point of view Mr. Fitzgugh's *Society* for the South is by no means without its value. Many fallacies, contradictions and palpable inconsistencies which might easily pass muster in conversation, stump speeches and detached newspaper essays being brought together and placed side by side in a book, are at once fully detected and clearly refuted, and not the less so that Mr. Fitzgugh does not intend it and does not seem to be conscious of it. Take the book altogether and it may properly enough be described as the case of Fitzgugh against Fitzgugh. The Kilkenny cats have made themselves famous in story by eating up each other. Mr. Fitzgugh does much more than that—he eats up himself! Long before he reaches the end of his book not the smallest grease-spot of his is left. He seems indeed to imagine himself a burning shining and perpetual light in the firmament of Slavery; but the truth is, Slavery won't bear the light; and even such a farthing tallow candle as this of Mr. Fitzgugh's, lighted as it is at both ends and speedily burning out, still serves, while it does burn, the single purpose and no other of showing up the enormities of Slavery and the straits to which its apologists are reduced.

Mr. Fitzgugh is a very pious man. He reverences the Bible, denounces infidels and free-thinkers, and of course relies confidently on the Bible argument in favor of slavery. As to this point, however, he modestly gives precedence to the revered and learned Moses Stuart, late of the Andover Theological Seminary, whose "Conscience and the Constitution" he largely quotes. The Bible has long stood out against the assaults of avowed unbelievers. At present it is exposed to a much more dangerous attack on the part of those who profess the most perfect faith in it and the greatest reverence for it. It is now much quoted for three purposes: for the defense and justification of slaveholding, of polygamy, and of polygamy. Mr. Fitzgugh is savage against the Mormons; but while scouting the example of Abraham as a polygamist, he insists upon it as a slaveholder. All we have to say upon this point is that if the Bible survives this triple assault to it on the part of slaveholders, rumsellers, and polygamists, it may safely set at defiance the attacks of all other foes.

But however, upon points of Biblical criticism, Mr. Fitzgugh may give up the leadership to our northern theological scholars, when it comes to the philosophical question, Curlius-like, he plunges into the gulf in person. He takes, however, due and judicious precautions to prepare the minds of his readers against forming expectations which he has no power to fulfill. With that singular propensity for enting up himself to which we have already referred, this brilliant southern philosopher, this justifier of Slavery on philosophical grounds, coolly informs his readers that "philosophy is always wrong, and instinct and common sense always right, because philosophy is unobservant and reasons from narrow and insufficient premises, while common sense sees and observes all things, giving them their due weight, comes to just conclusions, but being busy about practical every day matters, has never learned how to look into the operations of its mind and see how it has come to its conclusions." (p. 118.) Now as to this question of Slavery, we should not be unwilling to throw philosophy to the dogs (but what then would become of Mr. Philosopher Fitzgugh and his book?) and to leave the question to be tested by instinct and common sense. But Mr. Fitzgugh is too cunning for that. He insists upon quite a different test. "Men of sound judgment," he tells us, "are always men who give wrong reasons for their opinions." (p. 119.) And certainly if bad reasoning be the test of sound judgment, Mr. Fitzgugh's soundness is beyond all question.

This it must be confessed is a most easy and convenient way of defending Slavery, and no wonder that Mr. Fitzgugh claims so much honor and glory for having discovered it. The philosophy of the institution, as Mr. Fitzgugh calls it, constructed after this method becomes a very simple affair in which the more absurd and ridiculous a man is, the more profound he becomes. By a transmutation much more miraculous than that of lead into gold folly is made to answer all the purposes of wisdom. The absurdities on the subject of Slavery uttered in Southern newspapers and stump speeches instead of being proof of weak heads, bad hearts or a rotten cause, only go to prove the "instinct," "common sense" and "sound judgment" of those who utter them. *Lucas non lucendo* with a vengeance! Here is a new application of the art of sinking, and Mr. Fitzgugh is certainly entitled to have the hero of a new Dunciad.

Having thus judiciously established this claim to insist that the more completely he fails in the argument the more thoroughly he has established his point, Mr. Fitzgugh proceeds at once to carry the war into the enemy's country. Many fine things, first and last, have been said about liberty, and much blood has been shed for it; but Mr. Fitzgugh has made, or thinks he has, a great discovery. Liberty, he tells us, is not a good, but an evil; and that is the basis upon which

his whole argument rests. "Liberty is an evil which government is intended to correct" (p. 170). "With thinking men the question never can arise, who ought to be free? Because no one ought to be free." This Mr. Fitzgugh claims as his discovery, and as entitling him to the glory of founding a new southern slaveholding school of philosophy. Taking this principle to start with, it follows that it is the slaves and not the slave-owners who are the gainers by the system of Slavery. The slaves have all the comfort, pleasure and security of being taken care of and provided for, while all the care, responsibility and perplexity fall upon the masters. Mr. Fitzgugh, it will be seen, rivals the divine who attempted to dispose of the Universalist doubts which had begun to prevail in his congregation by preaching eternal punishment as a purely benevolent institution. Slavery, according to his account of it, is purely benevolent, all for the benefit of the unemployed poor, the weak in body and mind, the simple and unsuspicious, the prodigal, the dissipated, the improvident and the vicious, one portion of whom need support and protection, the other much and rigorous government. Our author has read "Alton Locke," also "a book on society," by Stephen Pearl Andrews, and thirdly Alexandre Dumas's "French Milliner." From the two first of these works he has been led to conclude that the free competitive system of Europe and our northern States is a failure, while Dumas's book confirms him in the opinion that Europe and the North have no other resource against general starvation except to return to Slavery.

We are very much obliged to Mr. Fitzgugh for his philanthropic concern for us and for the house of refuge which he so kindly points out. But we are under necessity of going to Virginia to find on a slave plantation that provision of occupation for the unemployed poor, of shelter for the weak in body and mind, and of salutary control for the prodigal, the dissipated, the improvident and the vicious, which he so much vaunts as at once the justification and the peculiar and crowning glory of the slave system. We make ample provision for such sort of people in our almshouses, penitentiaries and prisons; and if he will take the trouble to visit the North—we apprehend he has never yet been out of Virginia—and to inspect some of these institutions, he will find their inmates, so far as respects food, lodging, the labor required of them and the discipline to which they are subjected, decidedly better off than the best treated slaves anywhere in the South. One almshouse to a township, or jail to a county, answers our purposes without the necessity of turning every farm and every manufactory into one or the other, or into both combined. We prefer to have our overseers of the poor chosen in town meeting rather than have that office devolve by inheritance on a child, or an imbecile, or by purchase on a shark or a sharper. Nor do we perceive either the policy or justice of treating as paupers and criminals able-bodied men and women perfectly able and willing to take care of themselves, and disposed to do so by honest labor. But after ringing all possible changes on this excellent institution—"this beautiful example of communism, where each one receives not according to his labor but according to his wants"—especially the master—after showing that Slavery is the natural condition of man; after exciting our sympathies to the utmost by pathetic descriptions of the miserable condition of the great mass of the population in all free States for the want of it; after tantalizing us, as it were, with the prospect of this glorious remedy; Mr. Fitzgugh all at once giving way to his invincible passion for swallowing himself, upsets his own argument and blasts all our hopes of ever coming up to the beautiful Virginia model which he has taken so much pains to set before us by coolly disclaiming any "purpose of reducing the white man anywhere to the condition of negro slaves." "It would be very unwise and unscientific," he tells us, "to govern white men as you would negroes" (page 74). We must be content then with admiring at a distance the lovely social system of our Southern States, without any hope of ever being able to rival it, unless indeed we should go into the slave-trading business for ourselves and import negroes from Africa or Virginia.

But while thus vaunting the slave States in general and Virginia in particular as the only part of the world which a philanthropist can look at without the heartache, Mr. Fitzgugh still sees room for some improvements even there. Those which he most insists upon are the substitution of home manufactures for exclusive agriculture and a complete system of common school education for the whites—neither of which ever can be so long as Slavery lasts—to which he proposes to add the sale of all the free negroes into Slavery, for which he argues with great zeal, and the re-introduction of the law of entail and primogeniture! One of the reasons which he gives for insisting upon the introduction of domestic manufactures is original and characteristic: "The slaves of the South," he says (p. 37), "are cheated of their rights by the purchase of Northern manufactures, which they could produce."

We are sorry not to be able to furnish our readers with any precise information as to the personal history of this father, as he claims to be, of the philosophy of slaveholding. One thing indeed he tells us, but that we should have taken for granted even though he said nothing about it. He ever has belonged, so he says, and still belongs to the Democratic party. It is evident from several passages in his book that he has resided for many years in Virginia, but we are inclined to suspect him to be by birth an Irishman. Not to mention his perpetual blundering self-contradictions, it strikes us there is something of an Irish smack in the following passage with quoting which we take leave of Mr. Fitzgugh:

"Freemasons and Germans are generally infidels, agnostics and abolitionists. An Irish infidel, an Irish agnostic, an Irish abolitionist is scarcely to be found. No Irish woman ever disgraces her own sex or affects the dress and manners of the opposite sex. The men of Erin are all patriotic and religious, the women are

"Chaste as the icicle
That's curled by the frost of purest snow,
And hangs on Dian's temple!"

"This intimate connection and dependence of Slavery, marriage and religion, we suggest as a subject for the investigation and reflection of the reader. If ever the abolitionist is to succeed in thoroughly imbuing the world with their doctrine and opinions, all religion, all government, all order will be slowly but surely subverted and destroyed. Society may linger on for centuries without Slavery [there is some encouragement in that, certainly], it cannot exist a day without religion. As an institution of government and religion is strictly within the scope of our work, and as such we treat it."

A TRANSLATION OF THE GOSPELS. With Notes
By ANDREW NORTON. 12mo. Pp. 462, 502. Boston:
Littell, Brown, & Co. 1852. Price 25 cts. per volume.
INTERNAL EVIDENCES OF THE GENUINENESS OF
THE GOSPELS. By ANDREW NORTON. Pp. 328.
The same.

The lovers of sacred literature will welcome these posthumous volumes of one of the most ardent scholars and vigorous dogmatists, who have ever devoted the labors of a life to the elucidation of theology. They contain the fruits of his ripe studies and most earnest convictions. Although sent into the world without the last touches of the author's hand, they suffer but little disadvantage on that account, so completely had they been elaborated in the process of composition, and the greater portion of them, by the constant revision of many years. His mind was so habitually severe in its action, his demand for clearness of thought and expression was so unrelenting, and his opinions were so accurately formed and so firmly held, that no production of his pen could fall of bearing the characteristic stamp of his individual genius and culture. Besides, the contents of the two volumes first named above form the completion and summing up of his life-long intellectual labors. It was the favorite wish of his heart to present the Four Gospels in a version worthy of their intrinsic value and importance. In his estimation this had never been accomplished. He was accustomed to speak of most of the existing English translations, especially of King James's, with all the bitterness and scorn which he so well knew how to apply to the objects of his disapproval. According to his theory the other portions of the Bible were comparatively worthless, while a "just conception" of the teachings of the Gospels was essential to the moral improvement of the race. He felt an unshaken confidence that he was able to present these teachings in their original truthfulness—in a light which had hitherto been obscured by traditional errors and systematic perversions. Indeed, so strongly did he cherish this confidence, that he was often deemed to pass the limits of literary comity in alluding to previous expositors of Holy Writ—almost regarding them, like the false prophets before the appearance of the Messiah, as "thieves and robbers." He aimed to furnish a translation which should clearly express the meaning of the original and serve as the basis of a treatise which he intended to publish on the internal evidence of the Gospels. The present work contains the results of his labors. It has been edited with great care and excellent judgment. The translation itself was completed and carefully revised for the press some time before the author's death; and during the latter part of his life he was much employed on the notes designed to accompany it. In the collection and arrangement of the notes the task of the editors has not been light. Many of the notes were left unfinished by the author; others existed only in the form of memoranda; while still others had been preserved only in the manuscript notes of his pupils during his Professorship in the Cambridge Divinity School. Several explanations of passages in the Gospels have also been taken from the published works of the author, and a few from a course of lectures left by him in manuscript. The manner in which the editors have acquitted themselves of their delicate responsibility is worthy of all praise. They have equally consulted the fame of the author and the benefit of the reader in their judicious labors.

The intrinsic value of Mr. Norton's translation of the Gospels must of course be decided by scholars with whom the subject is a specialty. There can probably be little dispute as to its philological accuracy. The Greek of the New Testament had been the favorite study of the author throughout the whole of his literary career. His proficiency in this branch of inquiry was far greater than in philosophy or in the intellectual history and the literature of modern Europe. He often expressed rash and hasty judgments in regard to the labors of recent and contemporary scholars, consulting his prejudices, as it would seem, rather than competent authorities. But in his own more immediate department of sacred learning he is entitled to the praise of sobriety of thought and profoundness of investigation. Hence, a presumption exists in favor of the verbal merit of this version. It may throw new light on controverted passages, and aid the student in difficult details of philology. For popular utility however we apprehend it will not attain an eminent rank among the lovers of Holy Writ. The tendencies of the author were so exclusively intellectual—he attached such extravagant importance to mere correctness of phraseology—his mind was so narrowed by the fetters of a meager, scholastic theory of religion—that in handling the words of inspiration, it was almost inevitable that his touch should diminish something of their freshness, energy and celestial glow. His desire to clothe the venerable documents of the Gospel in the garb of modern rhetoric, we also think, is adapted to disturb many a reverent and tender association with their contents. Directing the most precious remains of antiquity of the moss-grown covering which has gathered around them with ages, the frigid, analytical philologist destroys the touching words that have sustained the loftiest hopes and nourished the purest sentiments of religious men from susceptible youth to contemplative old age. As an instance, we will give Mr. Norton's version of the Lord's Prayer, which is transcribed from its antique simplicity and warmth of expression into what will doubtless strike our readers as a comparatively bloodless and spectral formula. "Our Father in heaven, may thy name be revered. May thy kingdom come. May thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven. Give us this day our needful food. Forgive our offences, as we forgive those who offend against us. Bring us not into trial, but deliver us from evil." The grand lyrical close, to which all ears are inured in liturgical services, is omitted by Mr. Norton as the work of some presumptuous or careless transcriber in the ancient Church.

In the Notes to the translations, Mr. Norton does not confine himself to merely verbal and critical comments, but often enters the field of doctrinal discussion. His labors in this department we imagine are not likely to meet with special favor among thinking men of any of the leading speculative tendencies of the day. The same remark applies with equal force to the second work named at the head of this article. It is devoted to the "Internal Evidence of the Genuineness of the Gospels," with special reference to the mythical theory so elaborately set forth by Strauss. The "internal evidence," as the term is used by Mr. Norton, it should be observed, does not relate to the intrinsic credibility of Christian truth but to the historical probability of the Gospel narratives. Utterly destitute of the power of intuition beyond the sphere of the senses, the human mind, according to Mr. Norton, has no criterion of spiritual truth, and can form no sound convictions on the subject except on the strength of external testimony. This testimony can have no authoritative force unless founded on miracles originally addressed to the senses and sustained by historical evidence. The argument in favor of a Divine revelation derived from prophecy, and the intrinsic character of its contents, in the opinion of the author, is destitute of validity. No appeal can be made in support of the Christian religion except to the evidence of miracles. Hence the authenticity of the Gospel narratives becomes the sole question in controversy with the skeptic. On this ground Mr. Norton meets the reasonings and assertions of Strauss with learning, ingenuity, and force. His conduct of the argument, as directed against the deductions of Strauss, will gain the approval of most friends of revelation. But in other portions of his work he makes concessions which overthrow his own statements, and if admitted would prove the entering-wedge of infidelity. Thus, in his note on the account of Christ's temptation he rejects the construction of the event as a literal, historical fact. Nor is it to be interpreted as a myth, a vision, or an allegory, according to the opinion of certain commentators. It is, he maintains, the report of a discourse delivered by Christ, descriptive of an inward experience, but erroneously reported by the evangelists, through the ignorance and imperfection to which they were exposed by their manner and circumstances. But if the sacred writers might err on such an import-

ance. Add to this the Constitution of all the original States, formed soon after the Declaration of Independence, were incompatible with Slavery. And so, we see, the common law, the Constitution of the United States, without any legislation, was incompatible with Slavery. And the subject, decided that Slavery was illegal. And the subject, decided that Slavery was illegal. And the subject, decided that Slavery was illegal.

No one charges upon the old "Articles of Confederation" any recognition of Slavery. And no one supposes that the Federal Constitution was adopted, or gave to it any legal validity which it did not have before. The Federal Constitution was adopted, in the time when the Constitution of the United States was certain as any legal fact of history can be, and no one pretends that it has acquired any additional legal force since that time. This fact we have deemed an important object of the Constitution of our Abolition Society as a foundation of our reform measures. We have therefore affirmed further that

"SLAVEHOLDING IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL." It is a violation of the Constitution. It cannot legally exist under the Constitution, which does not sanction nor even tolerate its existence.

If Slavery be illegal the Constitution was adopted, then the Constitution cannot contain no legal recognition of it—to binding compromise with it. The Constitution could not have been recognized as legal what did not legally exist—could not have formed any valid compromise with it.

Slavery is unconstitutional because it is irreconcilably opposed to the declared objects of the Constitution, namely, "to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity." These grand objects of the Constitution can never be secured so long as Slavery is permitted to exist in the nation.

SLAVERY IS FORBIDDEN BY THE CONSTITUTION. The Constitution forbids Slavery by declaring that "no person shall be deprived of liberty without due process of law." The phrase "due process of law" means indictment and trial by jury for some alleged crime, and verdict and sentence in open Court. For this definition we have the authority of the *United States v. Story*, and Justice Brandeis. And by the two latter this definition is expressly applied to the clause of the Constitution of the United States. No one will pretend that any slave in the United States ever lost his liberty by this process, or that "due process of law" could ever deprive him of his liberty by indictment and trial by jury.

Amendment, which, like the codicil to a will, over-rides, displaces, and abrogates whatever in the original instrument might have been inconsistent with it. In another "Amendment" the Constitution forbids Slavery by providing that "the right of the people to be secure in their persons," etc., "shall not be violated." THE CONSTITUTION FORBIDS THE STATES TO MAINTAIN SLAVERY.

It does this by providing that "no State shall pass any bill of attainder, or ex post facto law, or grant any title of nobility."

Slavery is an "attainder" because it "attains the blood," and imposes disabilities on the child, on account of the condition of the parent. It establishes an order of nobility by that same process, and by conferring hereditary or transmissible rights of ruling on and control upon one or more of men or over others, their hereditary inferiors and subjects. It not merely impairs but annihilates the power of making contracts.

THE CONSTITUTION PROVIDES FOR LIBERTY. The Constitution not only forbids Slavery, but provides for the liberation of every slave, by declaring that "the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended in time of peace." It is this writ, says Chief Justice Blackstone, "which makes Slavery impossible in England." Its proper application would make Slavery impossible here.

"The object of the writ," says Blackstone, "is to 'bring the body of the person who has been restrained of liberty into Court, who shall demand redress of the cause of his confinement.' It is a writ, says Chief Justice Blackstone, 'to do, as JUSTICE shall appear.'" (16 Charles II, Blackstone's Com., B. I. 135.) "It is to be directed to the person detaining another, and commanding him to produce the body of the prisoner, with the day and cause of detention, that the Court may, to do, as JUSTICE shall appear, and receive whatsoever the Judge or Court awarding the writ shall consider in that behalf." (Blackstone, B. I. 131.)

This writ, according to Blackstone, was designed to carry out, more perfectly, the provision of Magna Charta, that no man should be deprived of liberty "without the judgment of his peers." It is the process of "common law," which includes trial by jury.

THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAS POWER TO ABOLISH SLAVERY.

It has this power just as clearly as it has power to secure the declared objects of the instrument that gave it existence for the very purpose of securing them the power "to establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity." The power to do either one of these six things includes ample power to abolish Slavery.

Congress has power to declare war and make peace. Slavery is an outrage on the slaves, and they are necessarily enemies to the nation that permits it. Congress therefore has power to make peace with the slaves by restoring to them their rights. John Quincy Adams affirmed the right of Congress to abolish Slavery as a means of making peace with the nation, and Slavery is abolished, we are continually exposed to a state of war. And the same principle affirmed by Mr. Adams would warrant abolition as a means of preserving peace or of being prepared for war.

Congress has power to provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States. But this cannot be done without abolishing Slavery.

Congress shall have power to establish a uniform rule of naturalization. To "naturalize" a man is to change his condition from that of an alien to that of a citizen. It is to make him a member of the nation, whether or not the slaves are already free citizens, it can declare them to be so. If they are, it can naturalize them, and make them such.

THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IS CONSTITUTIONALLY BOUND TO ABOLISH SLAVERY.

The Constitution binds the Federal Government to abolish slavery in binding it to secure its own declared objects, (as already enumerated), and in bringing the Federal Government into existence for this very end. If the Government is not bound to do this, it is bound to do nothing in support of the Constitution, or for the benefit of the people.

The Constitution provides that "The United States shall guarantee to EVERY State in this Union a 'Republican form of government.' This makes it the duty of Congress to see to it that every State maintains republican institutions. But what is a republic? The Constitution itself holds it in its own hand in the provision already quoted, furnishes the definition.

"It is essential to a Republican Government that it be derived from the great body of society, not from an inconsiderable proportion, OR a favored class of it." (Madison, in No. 39 of *The Federalist*.)

This was written for the special object of persuading the people to adopt the Constitution, by convincing them that it provided a Republican Government.

"The true foundation of Republican Government is the equal rights of every citizen in his person and property, and in their management." (Jefferson.)

And Mr. Jefferson frequently calls the slaves citizens.

STATE RIGHTS AND FEDERAL POWER. Whatever the rights of the States may be they cannot include nor sanction State wrongs. The States have reserved no right to violate the inalienable rights for the protection of which both the State and National Governments were organized. They have no right to do that which the Federal Constitution, ratified by them, expressly forbids them to do.

However limited the powers of the Federal Government may be they are not restricted from doing that which pertains essentially in the nature of things to civil government, namely, to protect the personal liberty of its subjects. Such a restriction would render it no civil government at all. The Federal Government is not restricted from the proper exercise of the powers expressly conferred upon it, nor from doing the service which the Constitution expressly requires it to do.

The Constitution and the laws of the United States shall be made in pursuance thereof," etc., "shall be the supreme law of the land, and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any law, Statute, or Executive Order of any State to the contrary notwithstanding." (Art. VI, Clause 2.)

We see this principle professedly acted upon to enforce unconstitutional enactments (in favor of Slavery) and at the same time to enforce constitutional laws for the protection of Liberty.

"The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, by any department or officer thereof." (Art. I, Sec. 8, Clause 18.)

Jefferson's Reports, pp. 379, 381; Kent's Commentaries, 2d ed., vol. 1, p. 441; 3d ed., p. 441; 4th ed., p. 441; 5th ed., p. 441; 6th ed., p. 441; 7th ed., p. 441; 8th ed., p. 441; 9th ed., p. 441; 10th ed., p. 441; 11th ed., p. 441; 12th ed., p. 441; 13th ed., p. 441; 14th ed., p. 441; 15th ed., p. 441; 16th ed., p. 441; 17th ed., p. 441; 18th ed., p. 441; 19th ed., p. 441; 20th ed., p. 441; 21st ed., p. 441; 22nd ed., p. 441; 23rd ed., p. 441; 24th ed., p. 441; 25th ed., p. 441; 26th ed., p. 441; 27th ed., p. 441; 28th ed., p. 441; 29th ed., p. 441; 30th ed., p. 441; 31st ed., p. 441; 32nd ed., p. 441; 33rd ed., p. 441; 34th ed., p. 441; 35th ed., p. 441; 36th ed., p. 441; 37th ed., p. 441; 38th ed., p. 441; 39th ed., p. 441; 40th ed., p. 441; 41st ed., p. 441; 42nd ed., p. 441; 43rd ed., p. 441; 44th ed., p. 441; 45th ed., p. 441; 46th ed., p. 441; 47th ed., p. 441; 48th ed., p. 441; 49th ed., p. 441; 50th ed., p. 441; 51st ed., p. 441; 52nd ed., p. 441; 53rd ed., p. 441; 54th ed., p. 441; 55th ed., p. 441; 56th ed., p. 441; 57th ed., p. 441; 58th ed., p. 441; 59th ed., p. 441; 60th ed., p. 441; 61st ed., p. 441; 62nd ed., p. 441; 63rd ed., p. 441; 64th ed., p. 441; 65th ed., p. 441; 66th ed., p. 441; 67th ed., p. 441; 68th ed., p. 441; 69th ed., p. 441; 70th ed., p. 441; 71st ed., p. 441; 72nd ed., p. 441; 73rd ed., p. 441; 74th ed., p. 441; 75th ed., p. 441; 76th ed., p. 441; 77th ed., p. 441; 78th ed., p. 441; 79th ed., p. 441; 80th ed., p. 441; 81st ed., p. 441; 82nd ed., p. 441; 83rd ed., p. 441; 84th ed., p. 441; 85th ed., p. 441; 86th ed., p. 441; 87th ed., p. 441; 88th ed., p. 441; 89th ed., p. 441; 90th ed., p. 441; 91st ed., p. 441; 92nd ed., p. 441; 93rd ed., p. 441; 94th ed., p. 441; 95th ed., p. 441; 96th ed., p. 441; 97th ed., p. 441; 98th ed., p. 441; 99th ed., p. 441; 100th ed., p. 441; 101st ed., p. 441; 102nd ed., p. 441; 103rd ed., p. 441; 104th ed., p. 441; 105th ed., p. 441; 106th ed., p. 441; 107th ed., p. 441; 108th ed., p. 441; 109th ed., p. 441; 110th ed., p. 441; 111th ed., p. 441; 112th ed., p. 441; 113th ed., p. 441; 114th ed., p. 441; 115th ed., p. 441; 116th ed., p. 441; 117th ed., p. 441; 118th ed., p. 441; 119th ed., p. 441; 120th ed., p. 441; 121st ed., p. 441; 122nd ed., p. 441; 123rd ed., p. 441; 124th ed., p. 441; 125th ed., p. 441; 126th ed., p. 441; 127th ed., p. 441; 128th ed., p. 441; 129th ed., p. 441; 130th ed., p. 441; 131st ed., p. 441; 132nd ed., p. 441; 133rd ed., p. 441; 134th ed., p. 441; 135th ed., p. 441; 136th ed., p. 441; 137th ed., p. 441; 138th ed., p. 441; 139th ed., p. 441; 140th ed., p. 441; 141st ed., p. 441; 142nd ed., p. 441; 143rd ed., p. 441; 144th ed., p. 441; 145th ed., p. 441; 146th ed., p. 441; 147th ed., p. 441; 148th ed., p. 441; 149th ed., p. 441; 150th ed., p. 441; 151st ed., p. 441; 152nd ed., p. 441; 153rd ed., p. 441; 154th ed., p. 441; 155th ed., p. 441; 156th ed., p. 441; 157th ed., p. 441; 158th ed., p. 441; 159th ed., p. 441; 160th ed., p. 441; 161st ed., p. 441; 162nd ed., p. 441; 163rd ed., p. 441; 164th ed., p. 441; 165th ed., p. 441; 166th ed., p. 441; 167th ed., p. 441; 168th ed., p. 441; 169th ed., p. 441; 170th ed., p. 441; 171st ed., p. 441; 172nd ed., p. 441; 173rd ed., p. 441; 174th ed., p. 441; 175th ed., p. 441; 176th ed., p. 441; 17